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FILLING IN THE HOLLOWED-OUT CORPORATION:
THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF U.S. MANUFACTURING
by Murray Weidenbaum
The current status of the manufacturing sector of American business furnishes a
cogent example of the recognition lag in economic life.
The industrial production index for the U.S. economy declined approximately 13
percent from a cyclical peak of 113.4 in July 1981 to a low of 100.5 in October 1982, or just
about back to the level of 1977, which is the base year for the index. Individual sectors of
manufacturing, especially primary metals, dropped even more precipitously.
During this period, a cottage industry developed (appropriately in the service
sector) based on the simplest relationship known to quantitative analysts: Two points
determine a straight line. A brigade of doom-and-gloom forecasters began bemoaning the
demise of American manufacturing and the stagnation of the economy generally. Mter all,
by connecting the number for 1981 (for almost any series except unemployment) to the
corresponding number for 1982, they observed a downward sloping trend line.
The year 1982 produced a bonanza of negative reports. Ira Magaziner and Robert
Reich wrote, "The U.S. economy is in crisis.... In the absence of new strategic directions,
the crisis can only deepen." 1 Lester Thurow reported, "The engines of economic growth
have shut down and they are likely to stay that way for years to come ... "2 And, of course,
1982 was the year that saw John Naisbitt's Megatrends proclaim that the industrial era was
over and that we were rapidly becoming a microeconomic information self-help society
characterized by a galaxy of networking constellations.3
Murray Weidenbaum is director of the Center for the Study of American Business at
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. This paper was prepared as an address to
the Annual Meeting of the National Association of Business Economists in San Francisco,
September 26, 1989.
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Given its special recognition lag, it took Business Week until March 1986 to
conclude that the American industrial enterprise was becoming "hollow," relegated to
marketing products made in other nations. 4
But the linear economic forecasters were caught off guard by the economic upturn
that began in 1982. Something else also happened in 1982. Late that year saw the
beginning of the longest peacetime expansion in American history. By September 1983,
the previous peak in U.S. industrial production was passed. The best was yet to come. By
the end of 1988, the rate of industrial production was 40 percent above the previous cyclical
low and 24 percent over the previous cyclical high. The manufacturing sector today
contributes just about the same proportion of the total output of the American economy as
it did three decades ago.
However, the good news often was reported as bad news. That is, rising
productivity enabled the industrial economy to produce more with less, less labor that is.
But to those who measure the health of a sector by its inputs rather than its output, the
results were devastating. Manufacturing employment in the United States has never
recovered to its peak of slightly over 21 million achieved in 1979.
Those who bemoan the shift in the U.S. economy from manufacturing to services
can be reassured by the knowledge that this is not a recent development. Despite the
attention placed on this shift since 1982, an inspection of the Census Bureau's Historical
Statistics reveals that the crossover from manufacturing to the service sector as
employment leader occurred in the nineteenth century. By 1900, service employment
exceeded manufacturing employment, by a ratio of eight to five. 5 That recognition lag
again!
Most realistic appraisals of the future conclude that the total number of jobs in
manufacturing is not likely to grow much if at all in the coming decade. But their
complexity -- and pay -- will continue to rise. Flexible automated systems are restructuring
production technology and helping to keep American firms competitive in world markets.
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Just listen to the executives in the European Community who fear post-1992 competition
from larger and stronger American enterprises.
A decade from now, most viable U.S. manufacturing operations will be more fully
automated than they are today. They generally will have converted to flexible systems that
can be continually reprogrammed to make a large variety of products, attaining economies
of scope, while maintaining necessary economies of scale.
The United States possesses the basic capabilities necessary to maintain leadership
in many industrial areas. No other nation devotes as much to basic research year in, year
out. R & D performed in the United States each year exceeds the combined totals of
Japan, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. 6 No other country
possesses comparable capability in computers and software. No other economy has the
depth, breadth, or scope of technical-industrial infrastructure that can translate basic
discoveries into useful products and processes in a relatively short time.
Moreover, the United States is still the world's largest market with a common
language and a strong entrepreneurial culture. The domestic availability of capital
resources to finance new investment -- and not just in LBOs and hostile takeovers -- is
awesome.
While the wailing goes on about the supposed erosion of our manufacturing base,
three key forces are at work which make for a strong industrial sector of the American
economy in the years ahead: 7
1.

Numerous company actions are reducing the cost of producing goods and
services in the United States.

2.

American workers and managers are showing a new awareness of their
personal responsibility for the quality of what they produce.

3.

Private investment in R & D, the basic fuel for innovation and technical
progress, is continuing to grow.

Let us examine the increased importance of each of these factors.

4

Reducing the Cost of Production
For a variety of compelling reasons-- most notably, to keep up with foreign
competition and to fend off potential takeover threats -- a great many American business
firms have been reducing their costs of production. Nearly every sector of manufacturing-automobiles, steel, chemicals, textiles, and machinery -- has been aggressively cutting costs.
The specific responses they have made range from simple changes in production methods
to a basic restructuring of the entire business. About half of the firms surveyed by the
American Management Association downsized their operations between January 1986 and
June 1987.
Because the compensation of employees constitutes about two-thirds of the cost of
producing the nation's output, labor costs are a natural for cutting. The measurable
changes in the labor market are dramatic. Competitiveness has been enhanced by the
substantial slowing of the rise in wage costs. In 1980, the average U.S. worker in the
private sector received a 9 percent wage boost. By mid-1989, the average annual increase
was half of that. In some industries, workers have "given back" prior wage and benefit
increases.
We should not be confused about motivations. Reduced wage demands and
givebacks do not arise because workers are suddenly worried about stockholders. Rather,
their new attitude reflects rough on-the-job economic education. The new competitive
reality has especially impacted workers in companies that, in the past, were unusually
generous in granting increases in wages and fringe benefits.
Strike activity -- whether measured by the annual number of strikes or the yearly
tally of people out on strike -- is at the lowest point since the Labor Department first
started collecting the numbers. For all of 1988, the number of work stoppages involving
1,000 employees or more totaled 43 -- compared to 300 a decade earlier. Despite the
growth in the labor force, the total of 121,400 workers idled by strikes in 1988 was a small
fraction of the 1.4 million annual average in the 1970s.
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Import penetration has sparked what often approaches a war on costs. Companies
have often obtained union agreement for more flexible work rules -- a broadening of
traditional narrow job classifications -- that generate important savings in the production
process. With new agreements to perform several different tasks, fewer workers are
required or the same number of workers can produce more. Also, downtime is reduced
when it is no longer necessary to wait for a worker with the right classification to make a
repair.
Automobile producers have made tremendous strides, in one plant reducing labor
costs 30 percent by getting workers to agree to perform tasks outside their crafts. Changes
in work rules also save money in many other industries. One oil company merged six
classifications into two at one refinery, cutting its workforce by 25 percent.
Many American companies have adopted the Japanese just-in-time (JIT)
production and inventory system. Numerous U.S. firms report that the system frees
millions of dollars previously tied up in inventory and storage space. JIT can also
dramatically reduce reorder lead times. However, using JIT requires better sales
forecasting and delivery planning than many American companies have been accustomed
to.
An extension of the economizing strategy is leading to important structural changes

in a great many of the larger American corporations. The horizontally integrated firm,
producing virtually every product in the markets in which it operates, is becoming much
less prevalent. Many companies -- notably in the chemical industry -- are finding it
preferable to specialize, focusing on specific product niches that are more secure against
foreign competition. This is to be expected as U.S. firms find themselves competing more
fully in a global economy. Fewer domestic markets now can be thought of as part of a
closed economy.

In addition, a rapid rate of product innovation has been emphasized by many U.S.
firms, especially in industries that are hard hit by imports. American shoe companies have
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responded with stylish footwear to ward off foreign competition. Apparel manufacturing,
one of the most import-affected industries, is relying heavily on style to compete with lowcost foreign products. Clothing producers are maintaining profitability through improved
timing and greater flexibility of production. Foreign apparel makers typically need six
months or more lead time to coordinate manufacturing with retail sales. Some domestic
companies can produce products for retail shelves in three to four weeks. That enables
them to set a trend, with foreign producers lagging a season behind.

Improving Product Quality
Foreign inroads into U.S. domestic markets have frequently been caused by the
superior quality of imports rather than just lower costs. As a result, unprecedented
pressure has been generated for improving the quality of products that American
businesses manufacture.
The payoff from higher quality is larger than generally realized. It comes from the
savings realized by doing the job right the first time and avoiding the costs of reworking
and repairing defective products.
At some manufacturing companies, employees receive as much as forty hours of
training to enable them to measure the quality of their output, a move that often has
resulted in a rise in defect-free products coming off the assembly line.
The enhanced concern with improving quality in American industry has not been
primarily a matter of setting up new quality control departments or even expanding existing
ones. Companies in the United States traditionally devote more resources to qualitycontrol efforts than their foreign counterparts. But quality assurance means more than just
a collection of expensive professional personnel who check, review, and improve
production practices. To produce defect-free products, it is necessary to emphasize quality
manufacturing throughout the firm. The most effective quality controls involve a shift in
the locus of responsibility -- from the inspectors in the quality control department to the
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people who actually do the work.
The Growth of Industrial R & D
It has become commonplace to state that American business thinks short-term and

that this unfortunate tendency shows up in cutting back on outlays for research and
development. Commonplace, yes. True, no. A little historical and statistical perspective
can be a real eye opener.
As we know, the 1980s witnessed a substantial growth in the R & D financed by the
federal government, mainly for defense purposes. This was a significant departure from
the trend of the 1970s, where federal government spending for R & D, in real terms, was
stagnant. According to the traditional wisdom, civilian R & D in the 1980s should have
declined as scientific and technological resources were being hogged by the military.
Actually, something very different occurred in the private sector in the 1980s,
simultaneously with the rapid defense buildup. For the first time since the National
Science Foundation began gathering the data, business outlays for R & D exceeded
government R & D spending. For the decade 1980-89, private industry outspent the
federal government on R & D by $445 billion to $430 billion (in constant 1982 dollars). 8 In
eight of the ten years, the private sector was a larger source of financing for R & D than
the public sector. The number of scientists and engineers in American industry doing R &
D rose from 469,000 in 1980 to 595,000 in 1987.
Consider the implication of these numbers. In the United States, private business
traditionally performs the bulk of R & D. However, prior to 1980, most of the projects
were sponsored by the federal government and business was responding to the public
sector's priorities. But since 1980, most of the R & D work performed by American
companies has also been financed and sponsored by them. Thus, the results are far more
geared to commercial markets than in the past.
On this basis, I suggest that there is an excellent chance that, contrary to general
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expectations, we will see more product and process innovation in the United States in the
years ahead. As Alfred Chandler, the distinguished business historian, reminds us,
technology has been the prime mover behind the success of the modern corporation. 9
The Three Factors Together
These three factors -- cost cutting, quality improvements, and expanded research
and development -- rarely yield quick and dramatic changes. Yet, their cumulative effects
are likely to endure and to reinforce each other. All three factors work in the same
direction -- toward developing new or better or cheaper products.
These changes will not prevent imports from continuing to threaten individual
companies. Influences external to the industrial economy often can be vital. Exchange rate
fluctuations, as we have seen in recent years, can be of especial importance. But, over the
longer run, these three basic forces make for a brighter industrial outlook for the United
States as a whole.
Solid evidence is already available. The average manufacturing company in the
United States has become more productive during the 1980s, in the conventional terms of
how much is produced per worker per hour. From 1973 to 1981, domestic manufacturing
firms averaged a subnormal increase in productivity of 1.5 percent yearly. From 1981 to
1988, the average rate of productivity growth more than doubled, to 3.8 percent a year
(that is also comfortably higher than the average rise of 2.7 percent a year during the
period 1948-1973).
Thus, there is a reasonable basis for believing that American firms will be more
effective competitors in world markets in the years ahead. Likewise, the relative
attractiveness of domestically produced products to American consumers is being
enhanced.
A word of warning is in order: these positive developments in American industry
do not guarantee success in the future. Overseas competitors will not run in place while
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U.S. companies try to catch up.
And new international competitors are vying for global markets. It is intriguing to
note that South Korean construction companies, which have increasingly been giving their
American counterparts tough competition in bidding on overseas projects, are now
complaining about the even-lower-cost rivalry from Turkish and Indian firms.

The Public Policy Outlook
The chances of a strengthened manufacturing sector in the 1990s will be influenced
by changes in public policy. Efforts to reduce the budget deficit on the revenue side can
result in further increases in the tax burden on saving and investment. In contrast, action
on the budget deficits via spending cuts would reduce the pressure on real interest rates.
That should help to reduce the relatively high cost of capital in the United States, a key
deterrent to competitiveness.
Should domestic protectionist pressures succeed in erecting additional trade
barriers, much of the burden would be borne by the industries using the higher-priced
protected products. Conversely, new trade barriers on the part of the European
Community could inhibit U.S. exports.
A new round of burdensome domestic government regulation would both raise the
cost of compliance and deter companies from investment and innovation. Further use of
"social mandates" to finance federal social objectives off budget -- such as higher minimum
wages, compulsory health insurance, required parental leave -- would increase the cost of
doing business in the United States. On balance, the potential changes in public policy, at
home and abroad, seem to be in large part negative in terms of their impact on the
industrial economy.
Thus, enhancing the competitiveness of American industry is not fundamentally a
question of how much government should do for manufacturing, but how to get it to do less
to manufacturing. Regulation should be made more effective and less onerous. The
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tendency for Congress to "do good" via social mandates should be curbed. Federal deficits
should be reduced, but not by adding to the tax burdens on saving and investment.
There is one key aspect of public policy which is ripe for positive improvement -education of the nation's work force. It is nothing short of a national disgrace that this
country's literacy rate is lower than that of most countries with whom we compete and our
drop out rate is higher.
This is not going to be another uncritical appeal for spending more on education,
although the marginal return on investment in education continues to be relatively
attractive. The fact is that, each year since 1980, the people of the United States -- from
federal, state, local, and private sources -- have been spending more on education, per
pupil, than the year before, and in real terms. We also spend a larger share of our GNP on
education than most other nations.
The real shortage in education is in ways of spending the money wisely. Take the
chronic shortage of high school math and science teachers. For decades, the public school
systems have refused to pay more for skills in short supply. If colleges and universities
were to follow such an archaic approach, every medical school in the country would be
forced to close, as would most engineering schools.
Ultimately, however, the future of manufacturing will be determined by the
business sector. The future lies with those business executives that make the tough
product, market, and financial decisions that are at the heart of increasing productivity and
maintaining competitiveness.
Substantial new investments in manufacturing facilities are often required. For
example, Timken --a firm with about $1 billion in annual sales-- recently invested $500
million in new and more advanced production equipment. This risky outlay enables the
company to maintain its traditional market position in the face of virulent foreign
competition.
On the other hand, the specter of high-powered business executives running to
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Washington with hat in hand is not a particularly noble one. In this regard, there is an
important role for the citizen/voter to support changes in government policies that make it
less attractive to travel to Washington for help. A bailout is a bailout, even if it's for high
density television. Say's law -- supply creates its own demand -- works with a vengeance in
this area: the supply of aid to "worthy" businesses encourages the demand for that aid.
To those citizens who are offended by large corporate PAC contributions and
generous honoraria to members of Congress, I suggest that they focus on the root cause -the great amount of arbitrary power over business on the part of government officials.
Those honoraria and contributions would not be forthcoming so readily if the money could
be put to better use in more conventional business undertakings. The nation's welfare -and its economic efficiency -- would indeed be better served by redirecting those resources
into product private investment.
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